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“Imagine there’s a cat lying on the floor in the living room. A
ball comes rolling into the room. What does the cat do?”
“I’ve tried that lots of times. The cat will run after the
ball.”
“All right. Now imagine that you were sitting in that same
room. If you suddenly see a ball come rolling in, would you
also start running after it?”
“First, I would turn around to see where the ball came
from.”
“Yes, because you are a human being, you will inevitably look
for the cause of every event, because the law of causality is
part of your makeup.”
“So Kant says.”1
I. PITTING CAT AGAINST DOG

I

n 2011 Chief Justice John Roberts mocked law review literature,
characterizing the typical article in the contemporary review as an
analysis of “the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary
approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, or something.”2 He went for an
easy laugh line, which paid off.3 Of course, the Chief was not speaking
literally. But he was meaning to make a serious point about disconnect
between the legal academy, as expressed through law reviews, and the
legal practice, as experienced by lawyers and judges.4 The Chief meant
to pick a fight.
The first volley came back in a since widely cited blog posting
from Professor Sherrilyn Ifill.5 She did not have to look hard for
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JOSTEIN GAARDER, SOPHIE’S WORLD 324 (Paulette Miller trans., Farrar, Straus,
Giroux, 2007).
John Roberts, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Remarks at the
Annual Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals Judicial Conference 28:45–32:05 (June
25, 2011), available at http://www.c-span.org/Events/Annual-Fourth-CircuitCourt-of-Appeals-Conference/10737422476-1/.
Id.
Lee Petherbridge & David L. Schwartz, An Empirical Assessment of the
Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 995, 998 (2012).
Danielle Cintron, Sherrilyn Ifill on What the Chief Justice Should Read on
Summer Vacation, CONCURRING OPINIONS (July 1, 2011, 4:06 PM) [hereinafter
Ifill], http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2011/07/sherrilyn-ifill-onwhat-the-chief-justice-should-read-on-summer-vacation.html.

4

UMass Law Review

v. 8 | 2

examples of good scholarship with practical import, such as a 2007
article on the Fourth Amendment implications of GPS tracking6:
highly relevant to and prescient of the Supreme Court’s decision in the
2012 Jones GPS tracking case.7 To Ifill, Roberts’ point was neither
funny nor true.8
The battle between the Chief Justice and Professor Ifill reflects an
old but persistent conflict. Richard Brust, Assistant Managing Editor
of the ABA Journal, filled in the history ably in an article for that
magazine.9 Roberts’ position can be traced in recent times to a 1992
missive by D.C. Circuit Judge Harry T. Edwards who, to much
subsequent acclaim, lambasted “ivory-tower elitism.”10 But Brust,
moreover, traced the quarrel over law review efficacy “practically to
the origin of the American law journal,”11 marking its first citation in
the high Court in 1897,12 its subsequent proliferation, and its first
notorious torment by a ruthless critic in 1936.13 So Roberts and Ifill
demonstrate the journalistic maxim that nothing happens for the first
time.14
This latest round of hostilities has been complemented by
empirical research published in 2011 and 2012 by Professors Lee
Petherbridge and David L. Schwartz.15 As summarized by Brust, the
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Id. (citing Renee Hutchins, Tied Up in Knots: GPS Technology and the Fourth
Amendment, 419 UCLA L. REV. 409 (2007)).
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Ifill, supra note 5.
See Richard Brust, The High Bench vs. the Ivory Tower, A.B.A. J (Feb. 1, 2012),
http:
//www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_high_bench_vs._the_ivory
_tower/.
Id. (quoting Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal
Education and the Legal Profession, 91. MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992)).
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 350 n.1
(1897) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Amasa M. Eaton, On Contracts in
Restraint, 4 HARV. L. REV. 128 (1890))).
Id. (quoting Fred Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REV. 38 (1937)
(“The average law review writer is peculiarly able to say nothing with an air of
great importance.”)).
For my own first exposure to this maxim, I must credit Professors Hampden
Smith, ret., and Brian Richardson, School of Journalism at Washington and Lee
University.
Brust, supra note 9 (citing David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, An Empirical
Assessment of the Supreme Court’s Use of Legal Scholarship, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 995 (2012); David L. Schwartz & Lee Petherbridge, The Use of Legal
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pair’s studies found increases in the use of legal scholarship by the
federal courts with a thirty-two percent increase in the Supreme Court
from 1949 to 2009.16 Especially interesting was a greater incidence of
scholarly invocation amid divided courts with dissenting opinions.17
And, as observers have been keen to point out since the Roberts
comment, the Chief himself is no stranger to reliance on scholarship
when it suits his interests18—for example, his controversial conclusion
that lay at the heart of the Court’s 2012 healthcare decision in NFIB v.
Sebelius was one espoused earlier by professors Robert Cooter and
Neil Siegel.19
Yet there remains something appealing about Chief Justice
Roberts’ comment, something that resonates in our present collective
perception of the law and legal education. Were Roberts’ claim simply
a fabrication from whole cloth, it would not stick in the craw so. In
fact, conditions were ripe for Roberts to re-ignite the old conflict.20
Whether or not what he said was an accurate portrayal of law review
literature, his jab reflected a deeper anxiety that has been aggravated
amid the ongoing economic crisis.21
Just five months after Roberts’ 2011 comment, David Segal again
rattled legal academics and refueled the blogosphere with an article in
The New York Times that harshly criticized law schools for failing to
teach practice skills.22 And therein lay the true contemporary
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Scholarship by the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Empirical Study, 96 CORNELL
L. REV. 1345 (2011)).
Id. (citing Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 15).
Id. (citing Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 15).
See e.g., Orin Kerr, Chief Justice Roberts Cites A Law Review Article (Not
Written By Henry Friendly), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 25, 2012, 3:14
PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2012/06/25/chief-justice-roberts-cites-a-lawreview-article-not-written-by-henry-friendly/.
Andrew Cohen, Professors Provide Roadmap for Supreme Court Healthcare
Ruling, (July 18, 2012), http://www.law.berkeley.edu/13778.htm. (citing Nat’l
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 567 U.S.__ (2012)).
See Petherbridge & Schwartz, supra note 4.
See JULIE MARETTA MORGAN, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS, WHAT CAN WE
LEARN FROM LAW SCHOOL? LEGAL EDUCATION REFLECTS ISSUES FOUND IN
ALL OF HIGHER EDUCATION 5, 8–11 (2011), available at http://www
.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2011/12/pdf/legal_education
.pdf.
David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/business
/after-law-school-associates-learn-to-be-lawyers.html.
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manifestation of the hornets’ nest that the Chief Justice nettled.
Today’s handwringing over the efficacy of legal scholarship has less to
do with the subject matters of the latest research and more to do with a
broad-based reassessment of the very institutions of legal education
and the legal profession.23
Professor Frank Pasquale framed this bigger picture—in his words,
“situat[ing Segal’s assault] as part of a neo-liberal ideology developing
at the Times and other scriveners for the powerful.”24 To Pasquale,
Roberts’ characterization of legal scholarship as “pure selfindulgence” was of the same ilk as Segal’s crusade on behalf of legal
education reformers, and neither has the rule of law at heart.25
Pasquale leveled the guns of realism at these critics and fired:
To ignore the political roots of the decline of both law and
the rule of law in the US (and its obvious impact on attorney
employment) is to fail to even begin a serious analysis of young
lawyers’ problems. . . . [Segal] never considers how legal
education works to prompt legal challenges to corporate
wrongdoing. No one will have a job defending corporations if
there aren’t well-trained attorneys applying old law to new
corporate wrongdoing. That takes creative thought, a chance to
learn the policy behind law, and engagement with current industry
trends. It’s not something to be drilled into people by projecting
bar prep rote back into law school.
....
Segal never stops to ask: Why might a Justice like
Roberts want to discredit the legal academy? . . . Perhaps it’s
because Roberts, after long years in corporate practice, sees law
profs’ efforts to reinterpret old statutes and doctrines in light of
new harms . . . as one more nuisance for the clients who made him
26
a rich and powerful man?

Roberts’ criticism of law review literature was, thus, a shot across only
one front of a much broader conflict.
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See, e.g., Patrick G. Lee, Law Schools Get Practical, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2011,
at B5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230479
3504576434074172649718.html; MORGAN, supra note 21.
Frank Pasquale, New York Times Financial Advice: Be an Unpaid Intern
Through Your 20s (Then Work till You’re 100), BALKINIZATION (Nov. 20, 2011,
1:41 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/11/new-york-times-financial-advicebe.html.
Id.
Id.
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And indeed, a war is on. The economic crisis has spawned
unprecedented levels of student debt27 and lawyer unemployment,28
absurdly juxtaposed with unaffordable legal services and a crisis in
unmet legal needs.29 Plenty of pointing fingers place blame. The
informal system of training lawyers through theoretical preparation in
law school followed by skills education through practice-based
mentoring has collapsed.30 On the legal practice side, economically
squeezed business models are no longer willing to allocate resources to
training and expect newly minted lawyers to be “practice ready.” On
the legal education side, law schools are expected to continue
conferring theoretical foundation and professional acculturation, to
teach more black-letter content, to qualify general practitioners across
increasingly complex specializations, and moreover to assume
responsibility for practical training, all while slashing costs and
holding fast to a three-year time frame.
Whether the conflict is between Segal and Pasquale, Roberts and
Ifill, or the practice and the ivory tower, our fundamental legal
institutions seem teetering on a precipice of transformation.
Uncertainty over what that transformation will mean has everyone on
edge.
II. MAKING COMMON CAUSE
These are precarious times in which to launch a new law school
and a new law review. Yet here we are. The University of
Massachusetts is now in its first year of operation with provisional
ABA accreditation.31 This text is a foreword to the first generalinterest issue of the University of Massachusetts Law Review. Now
27
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See MORGAN, supra note 21, at 8–11.
Id. at 9–10, 12–14 figs. 4–6.
See MIDDLE INCOME ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3–4 (Michael Trebilcock et al. eds.,
2012).
See Malcolm Richard Wilkey, What Role for the Law School in American Legal
Education? Purposefully Restructuring the Law School Curriculum, 1981 BYU
L. REV. 1, 3 (1981) (“There seems to be an emerging consensus that the third
year as now constituted is virtually useless for all but law review students.”);
Patrick J. Rohan, Legal Education and Training for the Profession—An
Overview, 50 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 494, 495–96 (1975).
Memorandum from American Bar Association, Provisional Approval of the
University of Massachusetts School of Law–Dartmouth (June 12, 2012) (on file
with the American Bar Association).
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marks an appropriate time to take stock of what these institutions mean
to accomplish in our unsettled legal world.
UMass is the first, and only, public law school in the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts,32 and the mission of the school
accords with that role.33 The University Board of Trustees created
UMass Law on December 10, 2009, and on February 2, 2009, the
Massachusetts Board of Higher Education authorized awarding of the
juris doctor degree.34 The first UMass Law class graduated in 2011,35
an inaugural alumni cohort inherited from the predecessor Southern
New England School of Law.36 The first 1L class to enroll in UMass
Law now constitutes the Editorial Board of this Law Review and will
join the alumni ranks in 2013.37
The UMass Law mission accords with its uniquely public role and
stands in congruence with the particular position of the University of
Massachusetts-Dartmouth within the Commonwealth. The law school
mission includes commitments to: (1) balanced incorporation of
doctrinal, skills-and-values, and experiential learning; (2) access to
legal education; (3) civic engagement, public service, and
professionalism; and (4) preparation and motivation of graduates to
contribute to their communities and to the profession.38 Thus, the law
school aims specially to meet public legal needs with a capable legal
workforce.
That said, UMass Law is much more than a vocational training
ground. The lawyer as compassionate counsel, as public servant, as
32

33
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38

See Tracy Jan, UMass Wins Approval for Public Law School, BOS. GLOBE, Feb.
3, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts
/articles/2010/02/03/umass_wins_approval_for_states_first_public_law_school/.
Mission Statement, UMASS SCHOOL OF LAW (last visited Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.umassd.edu/law/about/profile/missionstatement/.
See Minutes of the Meeting of the UMass Board of Trustees 5–6, 8–11 (Dec. 10,
2009) (on file with law review); see also History, UMASS SCHOOL OF LAW (last
visited Dec. 3, 2012), http: //www.umassd.edu/law/about/profile/history/.
See Press Release, UMass School of Law, First UMass Law Class to Graduate
(May 10, 2011), available at http://www1.umassd.edu/communications/articles
/showarticles.cfm?a_key=2910.
See Press Release, UMass School of Law, First 53 UMass Law Graduates
Conferred Degrees (May 21, 2011), available at http://www1.umassd.edu
/communications/articles/showarticles.cfm?a_key=2917.
See Tracy Jan, Strong Start for UMass Law, BOS. GLOBE, July 6, 2010, A1,
available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/07
/06/strong_start_for_umass_law/.
Mission Statement, supra note 33.
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legislator or judge or councilperson, or otherwise as public
policymaker must be fluent in the law so much more thoroughly and
so much more intimately than the lawyer as mere client advocate. The
lawyer of public conscience must know the why of law as well as the
what: the history, rationale, and theoretical underpinning of the law as
much as its issues, rules, and applications.39 In pursuit of its mission,
the law school—not only as educator of students, but as continuing
educator of bar, bench, and public—faces a formidable task, yet aims
to fulfill a function that is foundational and essential to perpetuating
the rule of law in the Commonwealth and beyond.40
Before us is a course both redoubtable and exhilarating. In its
nascence, UMass Law will be subject to the push and pull of would-be
reformers and their opponents, of critics and champions, of Robertses
and Ifills, and of Segals and Pasquales.41 To make its way, the law
school will itself have to plunge from the precipice. Hand-in-hand with
bar, bench, and public, the people of UMass Law will discover the
next great transformation and will redefine legal education for its role
in a new economic order.
The UMass Law Review is the public face of UMass Law’s
leadership in this course. Contrary to the catcalls of the critics, the
empirical record is now plain that law reviews do matter.42 In their
pages can be found the ideas, the data, and the templates to tackle the
challenges our society faces,43 from the unmet needs for healthcare
and legal services to the preservation of civil liberties and the rule of
39
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ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING HOW TO
“THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 1 (2007) (quoting CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, A
SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi (1871)).
See Mission Statement, supra note 33; see also Jerome M. Organ, Legal
Education and the Legal Profession: Convergence or Divergence?, 38 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 885, 901 (2012) (relating legal education to the access to justice
problem).
See Ifill, supra note 5; Segal, supra note 22; Pasquale, supra note 24.
See e.g., Timothy M. Tymkovich, The Law Review and the Judiciary, 75 U.
COLO. L. REV. [i–vi] (2004) (concluding that law reviews do matter).
See Daphna Hacker, Law and Society Jurisprudence, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 727,
728 (2010) (“I believe it is clear that the law and society community must
maintain its flexible, open, and dynamic boundaries. It is this openness that
allows one to challenge the positivistic perception of the law and of science and
to produce reflective and complex knowledge.”). See, e.g., Nelson Tebbe &
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV.
1375–83 (2009) (discussing the right to marry as an issue of equal access to
government).
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law.44 If great effect is what we seek, the law review holds the
potential of great cause. Accordingly, the University of Massachusetts
Law Review, through its general-interest and symposia publications,
will further the worthy mission of the Commonwealth’s first and only
public law school.
III. FINDING KANT
Will the reader find in the future pages of this law review a
treatment of Kantian influence on eighteenth-century Bulgarian
evidence law?
Maybe.
To give Immanuel Kant his due, his thinking about perception and
reality revolutionized philosophy.45 He concluded that human
understanding of reality would always be limited by the filter of
perception.46 Moreover, he situated the relationship between cause and
effect as an inescapable artifact of perception.47 These declarations,
based on Kant’s observations in the 1700s, turned out strangely
coincident with quantum theory two centuries later.48 Surely there is
something here to be said about legal evidence, perhaps concerning the
limits of eyewitness testimony, or about proof of causation as a jury
question of fact.
And let’s not be too quick to sell short eighteenth-century
Bulgaria. The Istoriya Slavyanobolgarskaya, written in 1762 by Saint
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See Thom Ringer, Note, Development, Reform, and the Rule of Law: Some
Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the “Rule of Law” and its Place
in Development Theory and Practice, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 178
(2007) (discussing scholarly focus on the rule of law). See, e.g., Peter J. Kalis &
Judy Hlafcsak, Healthcare Reform: Let’s Act Locally, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 253,
256–58 (2012) (noting the need for a change in the way we deliver healthcare).
2 NORMAN MELCHERT, THE GREAT CONVERSATION 435 (3d ed. 1999)
(discussing Kant’s “Copernican Revolution”).
See BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 707–08 (19th
prtg. 1945).
Id.
See EDWARD G. STEWART, QUANTUM MECHANICS: ITS EARLY DEVELOPMENT
AND THE ROAD TO ENTANGLEMENT 181–82 (2008); see also Erwin Schrodinger,
The Present Situation in Quantum Mechanics: A Translation of Schrodinger’s
“Cat Paradox” Paper, 124 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 323, 328 (John D.
Trimmer trans., 1980) (contemplating the fate of the infamous cat).
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Paisius of Hilendar,49 marked the beginning of the Bulgarian national
revival and the beginning of the end for Ottoman rule.50 As an
embodiment of cultural pride, the Istoriya represents an important
statement about the resilience of human identity and, in turn, the
importance of self-determination to the democratic political
enterprise.51
The experience of Bulgaria at that transformational point in its
history was consistent with Kant’s conclusions on politics.52 Kant
propounded his theory on republicanism in his 1797 Metaphysics of
Morals,53 and he defined a state’s legitimacy exclusively in terms of its
united people.54 Kant went so far as to challenge the propriety of
majority rule over the free will of the individual dissenter, a line of
thinking that very much animates modern civil libertarianism.55
Today our U.S. Supreme Court struggles to adapt aged norms to
modern circumstances: the freedom of expression pitted against
corporatized politics,56 or the freedom from unreasonable search and
seizure pitted against GPS technology.57 I refuse to rule out the
possibility that even Chief Justice Roberts could mine something
useful from Immanuel Kant58 or the Istoriya.59
49
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PAISIUS OF HILENDAR, История славянобългарска, [History of Slavonic
Bulgaria] (1762), available at http://www.istoriata.bg/ (Bulgarian).
See R. J. CRAMPTON, A CONCISE HISTORY OF BULGARIA 45–46 (2d ed. 2005).
But see DONALD QUATAERT, THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE: 1700–1922, at 176–77 (2d
ed. 2005) (arguing that the impact of Saint Paisius and the Bulgarian national
revival was exaggerated to discredit Ottoman rule).
See CRAMPTON, supra note 50, at 45–46; see also R. J. CRAMPTON, BULGARIA
18–95 (2007) (describing the origins of Bulgarian national identity and modern
statehood).
Compare FREDERICK B. CHARY, HISTORY OF BULGARIA 26–29 (2011), with
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 112–13 (Mary Gregor ed.,
trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1996) (1797).
KANT, supra note 52.
Id. at 112–13.
See James R. Otteson, Kantian Individualism and Political Libertarianism, 13
INDEP. REV. 389, 395 (2009).
See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
KANT supra note 52; see also Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133,
134 (1915) (Holmes, J.) (mentioning Kant); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 514
(1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE CRITIQUE OF
PURE REASON, in 42 GREAT BOOKS 221(1952)); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
261 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring) (citing generally IMMANUEL KANT,
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What, then, will the reader find in the future pages of this law
review?
I cannot say whether the Law Review and its future leaders will
choose to take up Kant, or Bulgaria, or evidence law in the 1700s. I
can say that in the pages of this review, authors will explore the
education, practice, and profession of law, governance, and civic
engagement. The editors of this law review will always seek the
betterment of the bar, the bench, and the public. This law review will
be dedicated to the mission of UMass Law, to the people of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts and the society of which it is a part,
and to the rule of law in human civilization.
I invite you to turn the page and to join our enterprise. This is the
University of Massachusetts Law Review.
“Yes, the material of our knowledge comes to us through the
senses, but this material must conform to the attributes of
reason. For example, one of the attributes of reason is to seek
the cause of an event.”
“Like the ball rolling across the floor.”
“If you like. But when we wonder where the world came
from—and then discuss possible answers—reason is in a sense
‘on hold.’ For it has no sensory material to process, no
experience to make use of, because we have never experienced
the whole of the great reality that we are a tiny part of.”

59

PERPETUAL PEACE); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 68 n.14 (1972) (White, J.)
(citing Grant Timber, 236 U.S. at 134); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 581 n.10
(1979) (citing IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195–198 (W. Hastie
transl. 1887); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 665 n.41 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Immanuel Kant,
Perpetual Peace, A Philosophical Sketch, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITINGS 93
(H. Reiss, ed. 1971)); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 698 n.9 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
198–199 (1977) (mentioning Kant)).
HILENDAR supra note 49. Certainly, the Chief Justice—who majored in history
at Harvard College and graduated with highest honors, who aspired to be a
historian, and who once said, “In studying world history, I was very wide-eyed.
I was a kid from a small town learning about a much bigger world. It was
exciting”—could find something of value in a nation’s defining historical
account. See LISA TUCKER MCELROY, JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR: CHIEF JUSTICE 14–
15 (2006).
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“We are—in a way—a tiny part of the ball that comes
rolling across the floor. So we can’t know where it
came from.”

“But it will always be an attribute of human reason to ask
where the ball comes from. That’s why we ask and ask, we
exert ourselves to the fullest to find answers to all the deepest
questions.”60

60

GAARDER, supra note 1, at 326.
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